On clinical education : the introductory address to the clinical session, 1871-72, at the Queens Hospital.

  • Jordan, Furneaux.
Date:
[1872]
Catalogue details

Licence: Public Domain Mark

Credit: On clinical education : the introductory address to the clinical session, 1871-72, at the Queens Hospital. Source: Wellcome Collection.

Provider: This material has been provided by The University of Glasgow Library. The original may be consulted at The University of Glasgow Library.

    393/408 (page 179)
    statutes about crimes and punishments are to be interpreted only in Justiciary, and statutes about the revenue in Exchequer; while statutes about ordinary civil rights should be exclusively judged of by us, and those touching spiritual things and persons in the courts of the Church.1 I say this, however, on the supposition that the limited applica- tion of each of these sets of statutes is clear; and that no construction of them in the courts to which they are particularly addressed, would affect the proper or original jurisdiction of other courts. I am aware, too, that there may be questions of difficulty upon these last points. But to the effect of showing that there neither is nor can be, in this Court, any such absolute and universal power to fix the construction of all statutes whatsoever, I think I have said enough; and this is the only point to which I would he understood as now addressing myself. And with reference to this, I must conclude by saying, that where it is admitted that no original jurisdiction of this Court is affected, and no civil or patrimonial interest of the subject brought into question, but where the only objection is, that in a proceeding purely criminal, or purely ecclesiastical, the statutes which should govern such proceedings have been disregarded or misunderstood, I cannot take it to be doubtful that our jurisdiction, or our right to expound the statute or to redress the wrong, is utterly and entirely excluded: And, therefore, seeing that I find all these ele- ments in the case now before us, I must hold that we have no right to meddle with it; and that the wrong, if there has been a wrong, must be left to the same high and ultimate remedy which could alone be sought, or applied, if a similar wrong were com- mitted by the High Court of Justiciary, or by the House of Lords itself, in disposing of an appeal from the Court of Session or Exchequer. Before leaving this subject, however, I scarcely think it necessary to observe, that the suspenders never can be allowed to escape from the consequences of what has been said as to supreme courts in general, or to let in the control of this Court in regard to the Church, on any distinction between the constitution of its courts, or their special unfit- ness, (from the great number and constant changes of their members,) to be entrusted with the final adjudication of the grave matters that may come before them. From all this ground of pleading, it appears to me that they are absolutely excluded by the neces- sary admission, that, within the province which is conceded to them, they actually have such final and uncontrollable authority; and that the only ground on which our right to interfere with them is now rested, is the allegation that they have trespassed beyond that province, and exceeded their legal powers. I have already endeavoured to show, (I fear too much at length,) that unless they have also encroached upon our province, and unduly interfered with civil interests, that would be no legal warrant for our interference. But even upon the suspenders’ view of the matter, I take it to be manifest that the popular objection now alluded to, that the constitution of their courts is not calculated to bespeak much respect for them, and makes it particularly desirable that they should be subject to control, is palpably and entirely irrelevant. If they confessedly have an uncontrol- lable jurisdiction within a certain province, it will never help to fix the limits of that province to contend that they ought to have had no such jurisdiction at all. And really, if it be admitted that they may finally, and without redress, reject a presentee for insuf- ficient literature, who offers to prove before us that he has more learning than half his examinators ; or to suspend or depose a brother for immorality, upon proof of levities that, to our lay judgments, might appear to merit no such sanction, or on evidence on which we might think that no conviction of the slightest delinquency could be sustained—it seems idle to speak of the urgent necessity there is for our interference, to prevent the General Assembly from passing a law, (after two years’ deliberation,) by which an additional minister might be admitted to take care of the souls, and exercise spiritual discipline, in a part of the parish of Stewarton. And now, my Lords, before finally concluding on this main question of jurisdiction, I must take leave to say, with reference to some allusions that have been made to certain recent decisions of this Court, in which opinions are supposed to have been delivered contrary to the views I have been endeavouring to support, that when this consultation of the whole Court was ordered, I certainly did understand that any point previously decided by the majority only of a single Division, was to be held open for our reconsideration; 1 While revising- these notes of my opinion, I have been referred to a passage in Lord Stair, which seems to afford a precise confirmation of the doctrine above stated. It is in the 28th section of the first title of the fourth book of that great lawyer’s Institutions; where he says that “ it is implied in the office of the Lords of Session, that they should interpret all Acts of Parliament without which they must he incapable to determine all civil causes; which interpre- tations, however, he adds, “ have no other effect, hut in relation to the said causes; ivithoutpre- judice to other judicatories to interpret the same, as they are convinced.