Faraday programme / Select Committee on Science and Technology.

  • Great Britain. Parliament. House of Lords. Science and Technology Committee.
Date:
[1993], ©1993
Catalogue details

Licence: Open Government Licence

Credit: Faraday programme / Select Committee on Science and Technology. Source: Wellcome Collection.

    16/152 (page 14)
    i NR CR PIS A enna ef Dae She REN a POE EE ET arranging for development work to be carried out to exploit existing research results. Second, that higher degree students should engage in development work” (p.88). 3.28 GEC, also unhappy with the premise but for rather different reasons, wrote that “science and technology alone will not lead to new wealth-creating industries. Long term success is derived from competitive products and services, produced by efficient processes, and underpinned by competent sources of enabling technology. The key question, therefore, is whether a Faraday Centre becomes a useful source of enabling technology or whether commercial pressure will drive it to near-term product related activities. This near-term role would dissipate the funds for important speculative research and it would be seen by industry as yet another contract research centre” (pp.86-87). 3.29 There was also concern that the kind of research work conducted at Faraday Centres would be inappropriate. NERC saw “a danger that the Faraday Centres would focus their activities on current industrial problems and concerns” at the expense of newer environmental interests. They also considered that “the training received by post-graduate students within the Faraday Centres will be different from the normal academic route. It may be necessary to introduce a new qualification linked to industrial R&D that reflects this difference” (p.99). CVCP were of like opinion. “... the Faraday Centres will be concerned largely with developmental work which may not be considered suitable for doctoral research in the UK where universities nearly always require evidence of original research by students. Further thought needs to be given to whether students in the Centres should be working towards PhDs. The postgraduate training objective of the Centres is more likely to be secured if they are hosted by universities” (pp.78-79). Administrative arrangements 3.30 A number of witnesses drew attention to various shortcomings in the administrative arrangements proposed by the Working Group. The tenor of many contributions we received was that the detailed arrangements would need careful consideration. As SERC wrote, the proposals were “rich in concept - but rather poor on detail” (p.102). A “huge programme of work” was needed to establish selection criteria, funding levels, evaluation, and relationships with universities and other technology transfer schemes. AEA Technology were concerned that the academic researchers in Faraday Centres would not necessarily have contact with commercial projects (p.60). Sira, an independent RTO, were particularly concerned at the precise relationship between the Faraday Centre as a limited company and the host II, the nature of staff contracts, the establishment of coherent funding arrangements and the character of the Management Group (p.106). AIRTO actually suggested a different management structure, replacing the proposed Management Group by an Industrial Research and Technology Council (IRTC) (see paragraph 2.11 above). CVCP spoke of the need for assessment, performance targets and “sunset” clauses (p.79). DTI also presented a check-list of administrative issues which would need to be addressed including funding, management, franchise and selection criteria (p.83). 3.31 Some witnesses felt that the Working Group had neglected to address the issue of intellectual property rights. Greater definition was needed so that participants knew exactly where they stood (NERC p.99). Universities would need to “see benefits from the intellectual property generated as a result of their involvement” (CVCP p.78), while manufacturing industry would “question the ownership and exploitation of intellectual property” (GEC p.86). 3.32 Witnesses also felt that, whatever the administrative arrangements, the whole concept of Faraday Centres had to be responsive to the particular needs of particular types of industry, size of firms, and regions (NERC p.98). Thus BP did not want the imposition of a “single solution” of this kind, believing that Government should “encourage a plurality of substantive proposals from industry and universities on how best to improve the transfer of knowledge and expertise ...” (p.70). MRC wrote from experience that “there can be no single approach to technology transfer”. Their own Collaborative Centre concept had been suitable only for certain kinds of work. In some cases the need for the technology transfer process to take place in close conjunction with the innovative research activity meant in many cases that an intermediary organisation was not desirable (p.97).